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11. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. The Issue of Whether the District Court Should Have Dismissed William's 
Petition as Untimely Cannot Be Heard Because the State Failed to File a Notice of 
Cross-Appeal. 
William raised two issues on appeal, both addressing the question of whether he was 
denied constitutionally effective assistance of counsel on appeal. Appellant's Opening Brief at 
7-8. In its brief, the state "rephrased" the issues on appeal to include the issue, "Should the 
district court have dismissed Leer's petition as untimely?'Respondent's Brief at page 4. 
While the state describes this as a rephrasing of the issues on appeal, the issue of whether 
there was error in the District Court's decision to grant an equitable tolling of the statute of 
limitations is, in truth, very different from the issue of whether William was denied effective 
assistance of appellate counsel. Even under the most generous view of the situation, the state is 
raising a new issue, not rephrasing the issues William raised. And, this is not allowed in the 
absence of the filing of a notice of cross-appeal. 
Carr v. Cnrr, 116 Idaho 754,779 P.2d 429 (Ct. App. 1989) is dispositive. 
In Idaho, a timely notice of appeal or cross-appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite 
to challenge a determination made by a lower court. I.A.R. 15,21; see Johnson v. 
Pioneer Title Company ofAda County, 104 Idaho 727,662 P.2d 1171 (Ct. App. 
1983). Failure to timely file such a notice 'shall cause automatic dismissal' of the 
issue on appeal. I.A.R. 21. 
116 Idaho at 757,779 P.2d at 432. A cross-appeal is required in this case because the state is 
seeking affirmative relief in raising the statute of limitations issue. It is not merely seeking to 
uphold the district conrt's denial of the post-conviction petition on other grounds; it is 
affirmatively seeking dismissal of the petition on grounds specifically rejected by the district 
court. 
While this might seem, at first glance, to be a distinction without a difference, it is 
actually significant. If the district court's denial of relief is upheld, William may seek habeas 
corpus relief in the federal courts as he will have properly exhausted his state court remedies. 
See 28 U.S.C. $ 2254(b)(l)(A). However, if the case is dismissed under the state's statute of 
limitations theory, William might be procedurally barred from presenting his Sixth Amendment 
claim in federal court. Id. Or, the federal petition he files could be deemed untimely, because 
the federal one year statute of limitation is only tolled by a "properly filed" state post-conviction 
petition. 28 U.S.C. 5 2244(d)(1) ("a one year statute of limitations shall apply") and (2) ("the 
time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction . . . is pending shall not 
be counted" ). Thus, it appears that the state, by shifting the basis of affirmance from substance 
to procedure, is actually seeking to bar William from seeking relief in federal court. It should not 
be pennitted to do so. 
While in cases where a court reaches the correct result by an erroneous theory this Court 
will affirm upon the correct theory, the same is not true when the state seeks a different form of 
relief, as is the case here. "Pursuant to I.A.R. 15 a respondent is required to file a cross-appeal if 
affirmative relief by way of reversal, vacation or modification of the judgment is sought. 
'Although a respondent can make any argument to sustain a lower court judgment, the 
respondent must timely file a cross-appeal in order to seek a change in the judgment.' " Miller v. 
Board of Trustees, 132 Idaho 244,247-48, 970 P.2d 512,515-16 (1998); quoting Bewley v. 
Bewley, I16 Idaho 845,847,780 P.2d 596, 598 (Ct. App. 1989) (emphasis in original). 
Because the state has failed to file a notice of cross-appeal, the issue of whether the 
District Court abused its discretion in granting an equitable tolling of the statute of limitations 
cannot now be heard, 
B. In the Alternative, the District Court Neither Committed Fundamental Error 
Nor Abused its Discretion in Declining to Dismiss William's Petition as 
Untimely. 
Even if the state had filed the required notice of cross-appeal, the decision of the District 
Court should not be reversed because in ganting an equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, 
the District Court neither committed fundamental error nor abused its discretion. 
In its motion for summary judgment, the state argued only that the petition should be 
dismissed because it was untimely. No argument was raised that the District Court could not 
grant an equitable tolliilg of the statute of limitations. CR 3 1. Then in the hearing itself, the 
state argued that "once it does appear that the petition was not filed within the statutory time 
frame, it's incumbent upon the petitioner to indicate some I guess equitable reason for tolling the 
statute. . . . I don't see any of those kind of allegations here, and so I don't see where there is any 
way that we can get around the fact that this is just too late." Tr. 3/14/08 p. 5, In. 18 - p. 6, in. 10. 
In response, the District Court allowed an equitable tolling of the statute of limitations 
because the late filing of the petition was something out of William's control. The Court stated: 
Okay. Well, it seems like under the circumstances there should be some equitable 
tolling of the statute of limitations because there was something that happened 
that was outside of his control. Apparently, there was an attempt by Mr. Leer 
during the one-year statutory period to pursue his post-conviction relief filing, and 
that was eventually done for him. But by virtue of the fact that his court- 
appointed attorney didn't get notice until after the expiration of the statutory 
period, he didn't file it. 1 mean, he didn't file the actual petition for post- 
conviction relief. 
Under the unique circumstances of this case, I think that it would be inequitable to 
summarily dismiss the case on a statute of limitations basis. If Mr. Leer had sat 
on his rights and not pursued his petition for post-conviction relief at all until after 
the one-year statutory period had cut off his right to file the petition, then it would 
be a different story and I probably would look more favorably upon the state's 
motion to dismiss strictly on that ground. 
But under the circumstances of this case, I do find that the defendant - or rather 
the petitioner, requested counsel, counsel was appointed well within the statutory 
period. However, unfortunately, because of apparently the need of a conflict 
attorney to be appointed from the Public Defender's Office, Mr. DeFranco was 
not notified that he would be the appointed counsel until after the statutory period 
had expired. 
Therefore, I'll deny the motion for summary dismissal. 
Tr. 3/14/08 p. 17, in. 24 - p. 19, In. 8. 
Now, for the first time on appeal, the state makes the argument that district courts may 
equitably toll the statute of limitations in post-conviction cases in only two situations: 1) where 
the petitioner was incarcerated in an out-of-state facility on an in-state conviction without legal 
representation or access to Idaho legal materials; and 2) where mental disease and/or 
psychotropic medication rendered a petitioner incompetent and prevented himlher from earlier 
pursuing challenges to the conviction. Respondent's Brief p. 7. The state goes on to argue that 
because neither of these conditions existed in this case and because William's letter requesting 
the appointment of counsel should not be considered a petition, the District Court abused its 
discretion in granting equitable tolling. Respondent's Brief pp. 7-8. To make this argument 
work, of course, the state must not only establish that there was an abuse of discretion, but that 
the abuse of discretion should be addressed as a matter of fundamental error on appeal, as the 
state never made the argument below that a district court's discretion to grant equitable tolling is 
limited to only two sets of circumstances. State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743,748, 170 P.3d 886, 
891 (2007). While the state did not address the fundamental error problem directly, that problem 
must be met before it makes any sense to delve into the question of the actual limitations on a 
district court's discretion.' 
Under the fundamental error doctrine, ail error generally is not reviewable if raised for the 
first time 011 appeal. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267,277,77 P.3d 956, 77 P.3d 956,966 
(2003), as cited in State v. Anderson, supra. Because the state did not argue to the district court 
that it had no discretion to grant an equitable tolling of the statute of limitations except in 
situations wherein the petitioner had been incarcerated out of state and was without access to 
legal materials or assistance or wherein mental illness or medication rendered the petitioner 
incompetent and unable to timely file a petition, this alleged error may be addressed only if it is 
fundamental error. Id. See also, State v. Williamson, 144 Idaho 597,601, 166 P.3d 387, 391 (Ct. 
App. 2007) ("An objection is not preserved for review when the objectioii argued on appeal was . 
distinct from that raised below . . . ") ''An error is fundamental when it 'so profoundly 
distorts the trial that it produces manifest injustice and deprives the accused of his fundameiital 
right to due process."' State v. Anderson, supra, quoting State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 844, 282 
P.2d 871, 873 (1 992). 
Three factors prevent application of the fundamental error doctrine in this case to the 
question of whether the district court erred in finding an equitable tolling of the statute of 
limitations. 
The first factor is the question of whether fundamental error can ever be applied to errors 
arising in post-conviction proceedings. In Person v. State, - Idaho -, - P.3d -, 2009 WL 
' Again, while an appellate court may uphold decisions on alteinate grounds from those 
cited by the lower court, here the state is asking this Court to reverse a decision of the District 
Court, not to uphold it. Therefore, the question becomes one of fundamental error, not one of 
affirmance of a decision on different grounds than those cited by the lower court. 
9185 19 (Ct. App. 2009), reviewflled, the Court declined to apply the fundamental error doctrine, 
per the state's arguments in that case, to consider an issue which was not raised or preserved in 
the post-conviction proceeding itself, as opposed to an issue which was not raised or preserved in 
the underlying criminal proceeding. (Even though the state has cited Person in its brief, it does 
not address Person S apparent holding that the fundamental error doctrine is not applicable to 
issues not preserved in the post-conviction proceeding itself, nor does it address the fact that it is 
taking seemingly opposing positions in Person and in this case. See Respondent's Brief pp. 5- 
14.) 
The second factor is the question of whether the alleged error by the District Court "so 
profoundly distort[ed] the trial process that it produce[d] a manifest injustice." Anderson, supra. 
In this case, the state ultimately got the result it wanted in the District Court, i.e., denial of 
William's petition. Therefore, it is difficult to see how from the state's point of view a manifest 
injustice occurred in this case. While the state did not get its result based upon a dismissal for 
untimely filing, it did get what it wanted, denial of all relief to William. The decision to grant 
equitable tolling did not work a manifest injustice on anyone. 
The third factor is the question of whether the alleged error by the District Court 
"deprivejd] the accused of his fundamental right to due process." Anderson, supra. The decision 
to grant an equitable tolling did not deprive William of any right to due process. Rather, it 
furthered his right to due process by allowing him a hearing on the substance of his claims 
against the state. 
The issue the state wants this Court to address, whether the District Court erred in 
granting equitable tolling of the statute of limitations because such tolling is only allowed in two 
very specific situations, neither of which the state believes was present in this case, was not 
preserved below. And, while some unpreserved issues can be raised for the first time on appeal 
under the doctrine of fundamental error, this particular issue cannot. Therefore, this Court 
should not reach the state's newly introduced issue on appeal of "Should the district court have 
dismissed Leer's petition as untimely?'Respondent's Brief p. 4. 
Nonetheless, even if this Court determines to address the state's new issue, despite the 
lack of a notice of cross-appeal and in spite of the failure to preserve the issue, the decision of the 
District Court on this issue should stand. 
The state cites Person as support for its position that equitable tolling can only be granted 
in two very specific instances. However, that is not the holding of Person. Rather the holding of 
Person was that the Court of Appeals would not extend the fundamental error doctrine to allow 
an issue not preserved in the post-conviction proceeding itself to be raised for the first time on 
appeal. In dicta, the Court did state that Idaho courts have recognized equitable tolling of the 
statute of limitations for the filing of a post-conviction petition in two types of situations -when 
the petitioner was incarcerated out-of-state without access to legal assistance or materials and 
when the petitioner was rendered incomnpetent by psychotropic medication or mental illness. The 
Court never made any determination, explicit or implied, that those two types of situations are 
the only situations wherein equitable tolling may be granted, nor did the Court cite any case law, 
statutory authority, or court rule which would so limit District Court discretion. To the contrary, 
the Person Court appears to rely upon Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho 957,960, 88 P.3d 776,779 (Ct. 
App. 2003), but Sayas never said there were only two ways to establish equitable tolling. It said 
that there were only two "recognized" bases for equitable tolling and that Sayas had not 
established sufficient facts to justify a third basis. Id. It does not follow from Sayas that there are 
only two possible bases. To the contrary, Sayas assumes additional bases could be found, but 
that one simply hadn't been proved in that case. Id. (Indeed, the recent case Eby v. State, - 
Idaho -, - P.3d -, 2009 WL 131536 (Ct. App. 2008), demonstrates the reluctance of the 
Court of Appeals to allow a post-conviction petition to be dismissed for reasons outside of the 
control of the petitioner, and indicates that the appellate court would be unlikely to adopt such a 
restrictive view of the powers of the district courts to grant equitable tolling of the statute of 
limitations.) 
Moreover, while there does not appear to be any Idaho cases on point, the federal courts 
have recognized that, in some circuinstances, attorney inalfeasance will justify equitable tolling. 
In Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796 (9Ih Cir. 2003), for example, the Circuit Court concluded that 
the misconduct of Spitsyn's attorney justified equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period 
to file a federal habeas petition, because the attorney completely failed to prepare and file a 
petition. The Court noted that 
The fact that the attorney retained by petitioner may have been responsible for the 
failure to file on a timely basis does not mean that petitioner can never justify 
relief by equitable tolling. 'As a discretionary doctrine that turns on the facts and 
circumstances of a particular case, equitable tolling does not lend itself to 
bright-line rules." Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710,713 (5th Cir. 1999); accord 
Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2000); Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 
F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2000). 
345 F.3d at 801; see also, Ford v. Hubbard, 330 F.3d 1086, 1106 (9'h Cir. 2003) ("there are 
instances in which an attorney's failure to take necessary steps to protect his client's interests is 
so egregious and atypical that the court may deem equitable tolling appropriate"). The Circuit 
Court noted that other federal courts have reached similar results. See, e.g., Nara v. lirank, 264 
F.3d 310, 320 (3'd Cir. 2001) (allegations that attorney failed to inform petitioner when the 
Peilusylvania Supreme Court denied review of his case, that his attorney led him to believe that 
she was going to file the federal habeas petition on his behalf, and that his attorney told hiin that 
there were no time constraints for filing a petition were serious enough allegations which, if true, 
could constitute extraordinary circumstances to justify equitable tolling); Bulduyuque v. United 
States, 338 F.3d 145 (2nd Cir. 2003) (Attorney's total failure to file a federal habeas petition 
notwithstanding his being specifically directed to do so by his client "were far enough outside the 
range of behavior that reasonably could be expected by a client that they may be considered 
'extraordinary"' for purposes of application of equitable tolling.). All these cases support the 
district court's finding that equitable tolling was appropriate in this case. 
For all of these reasons, this Court should decline the state's invitation to reverse the 
District Court's determination that an equitable tolling of the statute of limitations was 
appropriate in illis case. 
C. Williain Was Denied Effective Assistance of Appellate Counsel When 
Counsel Failed to Arrue the Meritorious Suppression Issue 
In the Opening Brief, William set out how he was denied constitutionally effective 
assistance of appellate counsel when counsel failed to raise the meritorious suppression issue. 
William set out both why the decision to abandon the suppression issue was not objectively 
reasonable and why it was prejudicial. Appellant's Opening Brief pp. 8-27. 
Ln response, the state has argued that the decision to abandon the suppression issue was 
not objectively unreasonable because "Leer has failed to establish the suppression issue was 
'clearly stronger' than the issue presented [that William's sentence was excessive] such that 
Lehtinen's decision was objectively unreasonable." Respondent's Brief p. 19. 
However, as this Court well knows, sentences are rarely overturned on appeal because 
they are excessive. See State v. Al-Kotrani, 141 Idaho 66,70, 106 P.3d 392,396 (2005); State v. 
Calley, 140 Idaho 663, 666, 99 P.3d 616,619 (2004); State v. Jeppesen, 138 Idaho 71, 76, 57 
P.3d 782, 787 (2002); State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457,462, 50 P.3d 472, 477 (2002); State v. 
Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 897, 980 P.2d 552, 561 (1999). Experienced appellate lawyers often 
wonder if sentencing appeals are worth the paper they are printed on given the very deferential 
standard of review and the Court's denial of sentencing relief in even the most extreme cases. 
See e.g., State v. Windom, - Idaho -, - P.3d - ,2009 WL 961232 (Ct. App. 2009) 
(affirming a fixed life sentence for a 16-year-old in a second degree murder case where both the 
state and defense expert agreed that the defendant, a previously undiagnosed paranoid 
schizophrenic, who had suffered a psychotic break down shortly before killing his mother, when 
properly diagnosed and treated, was a good candidate for rehabilitation and probation.) And, 
unsurprisingly, the sentencing issue did not result in a grant of relief in William's direct appeal. 
CR 31. Yet, as set out in William's Opening Brief, the suppression issue was a meritorious issue 
which, had it been raised, would have resulted in relief on appeal. Appellant's Opening Brief pp. 
18-27. William will rely upon the argument set out in the Opening Brief to demonstrate that 
appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective in abandoning the ineritorious suppression 
issue on appeal. 
D. William Did Establish that he was Prejudiced bv Aupellate Counsel's 
Decision Not to Raise the Suppression Issue 
In its brief, the state not only argues that the decision to abandon the meritorious 
suppressio~l issue was not objectively unreasonable; it also argues that the decision did not result 
in prejudice to William because relief would not have been granted on appeal. Respondent's 
Brief pp. 21-35. Two reasons are offered to support this conclusion: 1) that appellate counsel 
could not raise and the appellate court would not have considered the question of whether there 
was reasonable suspicion based upon the information available to the police to support the 
detention of William because the issue was not raised below; and 2) that there was reasonable 
and articulable suspicion to support the continued detention of William after he had properly 
identified himself to the police. Respondent's Brief pp. 24-35 
The state's co~lteiltio~l that the question of whether there was reasonable suspicion to 
support the detention of William based upon the information the police had already gathered 
from informants and otherwise was not raised below is contrary to the record. 
In the suppression hearing, Nicole Loveland, a narcotics detective on the case, testified at 
length regarding the information she had, including infomlant tips, that the state argued would 
support William's detention. See Tr. 9/17/04 p. 92-99, 103-104, 107-108, 110-1 11, 120-123, 
127-131. 
And, at the close of that hearing, the district court stated: 
And, I think I've already told you, I think the parties can see what the issues are 
going to be. 
And with respect to the rest of it, clearly I understand that this was a warrantless 
search, and I understand Article 1, Section 17 of the Idaho constitution. And I 
u~lderstand the Fourth Amendment prohibition against warrantless searches, and I 
understand the various exceptions to the warrant requirement. And the ones that 
come to mind immediately are a Terry stop and whether or not this was a Teny- 
type stop that went into an arrest, and what was needed here. 
Tr. 9117104 p. 141-42 
Further, the defense briefing on the inotioil to suppress discusses the question of 
reasonable and articulable suspicion to support a Terry stop andlor probable cause to support an 
arrest. The defense brief states: 
The officers also had earlier obtained information about Darren Parton. From the 
information she and other officers had received from a confidential informant, 
Officer Loveland suspected Parton was working with Leer from the Shilo Inn. 
She suspected that Parton was using his car to deliver dmgs and that he did 
parking lot deals. The information against Parton, although perhaps more 
reliable than the sparse informatioiz on Leer, was also apparently not sufficient 
for the oficer to seek a search warrant. Officer Loveland had no reason to seek a 
probable cause arrest warrant for Mr. Parton. He already had ail outstanding 
warrant. 
In sum, on April 21, Officer Loveland had information she knew would not 
support an application for a warrant. . . . 
e. The Stop-And-FrisWTenv-Stop Exception 
In Leer's case Officer Lovelai~d admitted that she did not believe any crime was 
being committed in the parking lot. Officer Loveland admitted at the hearing to 
suppress, that after learning ofLeerYs identity, she had no reason to detain him. . . 
. The detention should have ended when Leer produced his valid identification 
and it was learned there was not an outstanding warrant for him. 
Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence, pages 7 and 10. Augmented Record (emphasis 
added). 
And, in the state's own brief on the suppression issue, it specifically addressed the 
question of the reliability of the infonnant inforination. 
Reasonable suspicion to justify a Teny stop may be based on an informant's tip. 
Adams v. Williains, 407 U.S. 143,92 S.Ct. 1921 (1972). In the case of 
anonymous informants, the information should be corroborated. However, here 
the confidential informant is known to Detective Loveland. . . . 
State's Opposition to Defe~ldants' Motion to Suppress pages 7-8, Augmented Record. 
And, in fact, the District Court also addressed the issue in its decision denying the motion 
to suppress: 
While the purpose of the stop in this case was to check for a warrant on Parton, it 
developed into an inquiry ofthe activities of Leer. The police had been tipped 
that Leer had been distributing large quantities of drugs. Detective Loveland's 
surveillance corroborated that tip. She saw Leer at a place (the Shilo Inn) and 
time where the tipster said he would be. Corroboration by law enforcement 
oficials of the details of an informant's tip can give rise to a reasoilable 
articulable suspicion. State v. Hankey, 134 Idaho 844, 848 (2000). 
CR Appeal 49. 
The state's current argument, that the question of whether there was reasonable and 
articulable suspicion to support the detention of William could not have been raised or heard on 
appeal because it was not raised below, is contrary to the record on the direct appeal 
The state's second contention, that there was reasonable and articulable suspicion to 
support the continued detention of William after he supplied his identification to the police, is 
also contrary to the law and the record. As this was fully explained in the Opening Brief at pages 
18-27, it will not be further discussed here. 
As set out in the Opening Brief and above, William did establish the prejudice prong of a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in abandoning the meritorious suppression issue on 
appeal. Therefore, the District Court did err in denying post-conviction relief. 
E. Williaill was Denied Effective Assistance of Counsel When Counsel Acted, 
Without any Strategic Purpose, to Vitiate the Plea Agreement bv Deriving William 
the Bargained for Benefit of Appellate Review of the Suppression Motion 
As set out in the Opening Brief at pages 28-32, William was denied effective assistance 
of appellate counsel when counsel denied him the bargained for benefit of appellate review of his 
suppression motion. As discussed there, Roe v. Flores-Ovtega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), is a similar 
case, which supports William's arguments. 
Floves-Ovtega holds that an attorney who disregards specific instructions from a 
defendant to file a notice of appeal acts in a manner that is professionally unreasonable, and that 
to show prejudice in such circumstances, the defendant must demonstrate that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's actions, he would have timely appealed. 528 U.S. 
at 477,484. 
In William's case, counsel failed to raise an issue on appeal that was specifically 
preserved in a conditional guilty plea and, but for counsel's actions, William would have raised 
the issue on appeal. William has argued that this situation is analogous to that in Flores-Ortega 
and that based upon this analogy, along with the other authority set out in William's Opening 
Brief, this Court should find that the District Court erred in denying post-conviction relief. 
In response, the state has attempted to distinguish Flores-Ortega. Respondei~t's Brief pp. 
37-38. The first distinction the state offers is that William's case does not involve the failure to 
file a notice of appeal. That is, indeed, a difference between the two cases; Flores -0rtega did 
involve a failure to file a ilotice of appeal and William's case involved a failure to argue an issue 
preserved in a co~lditioilal guilty plea. However, that is a difference that does not render the logic 
of Flores-Ortega inapplicable. In both cases, counsel failed to bring something before the 
appellate court, whether it was an entire case or a single issue, and in both cases that resulted in 
the denial of appellate review. 
The state next argues that the cases are distinguishable because Flores-Ortega involved 
ineffective assistance by trial counsel, while William's case involves ineffective assistance by 
appellate counsel. Respondent's Brief pp. 37-38. However, this is again a difference that does 
not render the logic of Flores-Ortega inapplicable. Whether trial counsel or appellate counsel 
acts to deny a defendant appellate review he would have otherwise obtained, matters not. In 
either situation, the result is the same; the defendant has been denied constitutionally effective 
assistance of counsel. 
Finally, the state argues that Floves-Ortega does not support a proposition that in order to 
obtain relief in post-conviction, William does not have to demonstrate that but for appellate 
counsel's error, lie would have prevailed on appeal, but only that, but for appellate counsel's 
ellor, he would have obtained appellate review of the suppression issue. The state appears to 
argue that once appellate counsel rendered the deficient performance by not raising the 
suppression motion on appeal, William could only obtain relief by undertaking self- 
representation on appeal to remedy appellate counsel's failure. Respondent's Brief pp. 38-39. 
However, tlie state does not cite any authority for this novel approach to ineffective assistance of 
counsel, and indeed there is no such authority. To this counsel's knowledge, no court has ever 
held that in order to establish prejudice on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
defendant must first move to proceed pro se and attempt to remedy the error himself. The lack of 
case law is probably rooted in the fact that such a requirement would be contrary to the state and 
federal constitutional guarantees of assistance of counsel. 
Contrary to the state's assertions, this case is analogous to Flores-Ortega. 
Appellate counsel did render deficient perfomlance when he declined to raise tlie 
suppression issue on appeal and that error was prejudicial because it denied William appellate 
review in the same way that the failure to file a notice of appeal denies a defendant appellate 
review. Given this error, the District Court should have granted William relief in post- 
conviction. 
111. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the arguments in Williani's Opening Brief and above, Willia~n asks that this 
Court reverse the order denying post-conviction relief and remand the case for further 
proceedings 
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